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Introduction
Economists’ understanding of the operation of sports betting markets has changed
significantly over the past few years.  Previous research emphasized the efficient
nature of sports betting markets, assumed to be composed of informed bettors
searching for unexploited profit opportunities and book makers setting prices that
fully reflected all available information about teams and expected game outcomes.1
In this view, sports book makers play a passive role in the betting market, setting
odds or point spreads to equalize the volume of betting on each side of a game or
match and earning a certain profit from a commission charged to bettors.  Recently,
Levitt challenged this description of sports betting markets, pointing out that, based
on evidence from a betting contest involving National Football League (from now
on NFL) games, the point spreads set by book makers did not balance the betting
on each side of games, leading book makers to actively participate in the market by
«taking a position» on games by accepting an unbalanced volume of bets on games
and exposing themselves to additional risk.2 Levitt developed a model that
demonstrated how the presence of uninformed bettors in the market lead book
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makers to systematically change prices to increase profits by exploiting betting by
these uninformed bettors, motivating the observed outcomes in the contest he
analyzed.
Two competing models currently exist that describe sports betting markets.
The standard model features informed bettors and profit maximizing book makers
who maximize profits with little risk by setting prices to balance the volume of
betting on either side of games.  Under this model, book makers can accurately
predict how bettors will behave, and set their prices to equalize the volume of
betting on either side of games; the prediction of a balanced volume of betting is a
key feature of this model.  The alternative model features both informed and
uninformed bettors participating in the market and profit maximizing book makers
who allow unbalanced bet volume to occur in order to increase profits above the
level that would be earned if the volume of betting was equal on each side of
games.  Under this model, book makers systematically exploit uninformed bettors
to increase their profits; an unbalanced volume of betting is a key feature of this
model.
In this paper, I develop evidence of unbalanced betting volume in the point
spread betting market for National Basketball Association (from now on NBA)
games in the 2003/2004 through 2007/2008 seasons, and explore the possibility
that this unbalanced betting volume reflects book makers systematically exploiting
uninformed bettors participating in this market.  The evidence clearly shows that
betting on the average NBA game over this period was unbalanced, with a majority
of the bets placed on the stronger team.  In addition, an analysis of the relationship
between the number of bets placed on the stronger team and the probability that a
bet on the stronger team pays off suggests that book makers may systematically
alter point spreads to exploit these imbalances in bet volumes.
This paper focuses on point spread betting on NBA games.  Point spread
betting is commonly used for betting in North America on professional and college
(American) football and basketball, but not used much elsewhere.  The alternative
betting system, odds betting, is used frequently in betting on horse racing, football
matches, ice hockey, baseball, and other sports around the world.  In odds betting,
a bettor bets on the outcome, in terms of winning or losing a game, race or match,
and bets on the stronger team or horse pay off at lower odds.
Point spread bets are not based on wins or losses by teams; point spread
bets are based on the difference in the number of points scored by the two teams
participating in a game. For example, suppose that the Boston Celtics are playing
the Chicago Bulls in Chicago, and Chicago is considered the stronger team by
sports book makers and bettors.  In order to take bets on this game, a book maker
posts a point spread, or line, that specifies the number of points by which Chicago
must win the game for a bet on Chicago to pay off.  If Chicago was considered
much stronger than Boston, this point spread might be seven points.  In the Las
Vegas sports betting jargon, the line would be Boston at Chicago -7; Boston would
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win the game by 8 or more points for a bet on the Bulls to pay off. If the Bulls win
by six points or less, or the Bulls lose the game, then bets on the Bulls lose and bets
on the Celtics win.  Note that even in games with teams of unequal ability, point
spread betting can result in interesting wagers.  In games played by teams of vastly
unequal strength, the point spread is simply made very large by the book maker.
For example, if the Chicago Bulls were the best team in the league and the Boston
Celtics the worst, a book maker could set the line on the game at 20 points, meaning
that Chicago would have to score 21 points more than the Celtics for a bet on the
favored Bulls to pay off.
Point spread betting works on a «risk 11 to win 10» basis.  A bettor wagering
on the Chicago Bulls in the above example would place a $110 dollar bet on the
Bulls.  If the Bulls win the game by 8 or more points, the bettor gets his $110 back
and wins an additional $100.  If the Bulls win by 6 or fewer points, or lose the
game, the bettor loses $110.  If the Bulls win by exactly 7 points, the bet is a
«push» and all money is refunded to bettors.  The additional dollar risked is a
commission collected by the book maker, and is often called «vigorish» or simply
«the vig» by sports bettors.
Point spreads are set by sports book makers in Las Vegas, and point spread
betting takes place at these sports books, or at online, off-shore internet betting
sites.  The point spreads offered by different bookmakers on games are almost
always identical, offering little chance for arbitrage opportunities by placing bets
with multiple book makers.  The point spread on a game can change over time, but
the bettor’s wager is based on the point spread that was in place at the time the
wager was made.
1. A Simple Model of Sports Book Operation
Levitt developed a formal model of point spread betting.3  In this model, the book
maker takes bets on a game between two teams, Team 1 and Team 2, and chooses
the probability that a bet on team 1 wins, π 1, by setting the point spread to maximize
expected returns on the game.  Since only two teams are involved, the probability
that a bet on Team 2 wins is π 2 = (1-π 1).  The model did not explicitly include the
point spread on the game as a variable. Instead, bettors implicitly interpret the
point spread in terms of the probability that a bet on Team 1 will win, and decide
whether to bet on Team 1 or Team 2.  If f1 represents the fraction of bets placed on
Team 1 and f2 represents the fraction of bets placed on Team 2, then the expected
return to the book maker from point spread bets on this game is
E[R]= [(1 - π 1)f1 + (1 - π 2)f2]( 1 + v) – (π 1f1 + π 2f2) (1)
____________________
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The first term on the right hand side of equation (1) is expected winnings
by the book maker from losing bets and v is the commission charged on point
spread bets. The second term on the right had side of equation (1) is expected
losses by the sports book on winning bets.  Humphreys extended this model by
assuming a functional relationship between the probability that a bet placed on
Team 1 wins, π 1 and the fraction of bets placed on Team 1, f1.4  Formally
π 1 = β  f1 (2)
This equation can be interpreted in terms of the difference between the
objective probability that a bet on Team 1 wins, π 1, and bettors’ subjective probability
that a bet on Team 1 wins, reflected by the fraction of bets placed on Team 1, f1.  π 1
depends on the point spread, the relative strengths of the two teams, and random
factors that take place during the game.  f1 depends on the point spread, bettors
perceptions of the relative strengths of the two teams, bettors perceptions of the
random factors that take place during the game, and also on bettors preferences for
betting on the two teams involved in the game.  The parameter β  reflects the presence
of potential biases in bettors’ perceptions of the probability that a bet on Team 1
will win, and the presence of uninformed bettors in NBA point spread betting
markets.  If β  =1, then bettors are unbiased in the sense that their subjective
assessment of the probability that a bet on Team 1 will win is equal to the objective
probability π 1. But if β  is not equal to 1, then bettors will be biased in that their
subjective assessment differs from the objective probability π 1. β  might be different
than one because bettors derive utility from the act of betting, as in the utility of
gambling model developed by Conlisk.5  Alternatively, bias in bettors’ subjective
probability that a bet on Team 1 would win could arise from bettors making persistent
mistakes like those described by Tversky and Kahneman.6 The presence of
uninformed bettors in horse race betting has been hypothesized as a cause for the
well-established favorite-longshot bias in those markets.7
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and solving for the fraction of
bets placed on Team 1 that maximizes the expected returns yields an expression













= f                                                                                                                   (3)
____________________
4 B. R. HUMPHREYS, Prices, Point Spreads and Profits: Evidence from the National Football
League, University of Alberta Department of Economics Working Paper n. 2010-05, 2010.
5 J. CONLISK, The Utility of Gambling, in J. of Risk and Uncert., vol. 6, 1993, 225-75.
6 A. TVERSKY, D. KAHNEMAN, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Science, vol.
185, 1974, 1124-1131.
7 See L. COLEMAN, New Light on the Longshot Bias, in Ap. Ec., vol. 36, 2004, 315-326 for a recent
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Equation (3) shows that attracting an equal volume of bets on each side of
a game is only profit maximizing for a book maker if the market contains only
unbiased bettors, in the sense that β  =1 reflects lack of bettors’ bias.  If bettors’
subjective probability that a bet placed on Team 1 will win differs from the objective
probability that a bet on Team 1 will win, then the book maker can increase the
expected return by accepting an unequal volume of bets on the game.  Thus the
balanced book model described above emerges as a special case of this model.
A book maker increases expected returns when uninformed bettors are
betting on a game by reducing π 1, the probability that a bet on Team 1 wins, if the
uninformed bettors prefer to bet on Team 1.  Suppose that some exogenous fraction
of uninformed bettors will always bet on Team 1 at any point spread, either because
they derive utility from betting on Team 1 or they make persistent, Tversky-
Kahenman type mistakes based on heuristics that lead them to bet on Team 1,
while informed bettors use all available information to form an expectation of π 1,
E[π 1] and bet on Team 1 only if E[π 1] exceeds some threshold value.  If the book
maker sets the point spread to balance the volume of bets by informed bettors on
each team, the overall volume of bets will still be unbalanced because the uninformed
bettors only bet on Team 1.  In this case, bet volume on games would be imbalanced,
but the probability that a bet on Team 1 wins would be π 1=0.5, since that value
balances informed betting equally on the two teams.  The book maker would earn
a certain profit from the commission charged to losing bettors, but in about half of
the games, the book maker suffers a relatively large loss because the favored team,
which attracts a majority of the bets, covers the point spread; in the other half of
the games, the book maker gets a relatively large win because the favored team
does not cover the point spread.
Alternatively, if there are enough uninformed bettors in the market, the
book maker could systematically change the point spread to reduce π 1 below 0.5.
This leads to an imbalance in betting by informed bettors, who know that the point
spread set is not consistent with π 1=0.5.  The book makers’ expected returns could
still increase in this case, because uninformed bettors still bet on Team 1, even at
this unfavorable point spread.  The volume of bets on either side of this game
depends on the number of informed and uninformed bettors that bet on the game.
This simple model of sports book operation provides three predictions
about outcomes in point spread betting markets.  First, a balanced book does not
necessarily maximize expected returns for book makers.  Second, the presence of
unbalanced betting on games indicates the presence of uninformed bettors in point
spread betting markets.  Third, the presence of unbalanced betting combined with
evidence that the probability that a bet on the favored team wins less than 50% of
the time suggests that book makers shade point spreads in a way to exploit
uninformed bettors.  In the next section, I look for evidence of these outcomes in
point spread betting on NBA games.18                                                                                                              Brad R. Humphreys
2. Data Description
The data analyzed were obtained from Sports Insights, an online sports gambling
information service.  Sport Insights recently began making betting data, including
information on betting volume on individual games, available for a fee.  Sports
Insights has agreements to obtain and publish betting volume data from four large
on-line sports book makers: BetUS, Carib Sports, Sportbet, and Sportsbook.com.
The data files that Sports Insights makes available include the opening and closing
point spreads, the final score of the game, and the percentage of bets reported on
each side of point spread bets  for all regular season games played in the NBA in
the 2003/2004 through 2007/2008 seasons.   The betting volume data distributed
represents the average betting volume across the four participating sports books.
Note that the betting volume data represents the fraction of bets placed on each
side in the point spread betting market, and not the fraction of dollars bet on each
side.  Data on the fraction of dollars bet are not available from Sports Insights.  In
the empirical analysis, I assume that the average size of a bet placed on each team
is equal, so that the number of bets placed on each team is equal to the dollars bet
on each team.  A cursory examination of data on dollars bet on each side of games
at various gambling web sites indicates that this assumption is reasonable;
unfortunately, I lack comprehensive data on total dollars bet on each game over
this sample period.
I analyze betting on regular season NBA games.  The NBA regular season
consists of 82 games, 41 at home and 41 away from home and runs from late
October or early November until mid April. The NBA also plays a pre-season
schedule of games lasting about a month prior to the start of the regular season,
and some wagering takes place on these games.  I ignore betting on pre-season
games.  The NBA also holds an annual post-season tournament to determine the
league champion.  I also ignore betting on post-season NBA games.
A number of papers have analyzed betting on NBA games.  Sauer
summarized the early literature on NBA betting.8  Much of this early literature
focused on assessing the efficiency in NBA point spread betting markets by using
regression models to determine of the point spread was an unbiased, efficient
predictor of game scores.  Recent research looks for evidence of unexploited
inefficiencies and bettor misperceptions in NBA point spread betting markets.  Paul
and Weinbach found evidence of inefficiencies in NBA bets on large home underdogs,
and teams on long win streaks over the 1996/1997 to 2001/2002 seasons.9 Gandar,
Zuber and Dare examined a related market, betting on the total score in NBA
games, for the 1986/1987 through 1996/1997 seasons.10 They found evidence that
____________________
8 R. SAUER, The Economics of Wagering Markets, cit., 1.
9 R. J. PAUL, A. P. WEINBACH, Bettor Misperceptions in the NBA: The Overbetting of Large Favorites
and the «Hot Hand», in J. of Sp. Econ., vol. 6, n. 4, 2005, 390-400.
10 J.M. GANDAR, R.A. ZUBER, W.H. DARE, The Search for Informed Traders in the Totals Betting
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the final total posted by book makers was a better predictor of the actual total
number of points scored in NBA games than the first total posted, suggesting that
observed changes in the totals posted by book makers contain fundamental
information about the games.  Paul, Weinbach, and Wilson also examined total
score betting in the NBA.11  None of these papers examine betting volume on NBA
games, or look for evidence of point spread shading by sports books in this market.
Table 1 shows sample averages for a number of key variables in this data
set for each season.  Note that the number of observations in each season varies
because not every NBA game has a point spread and information about the volume
of bets on each side in the data made available by Sports Insights.  Home teams
tend to be favored in NBA point spread betting, and home teams are, on average,
favored by about 3.5 points per game.  The point spreads set by sports books are
quite close to the actual difference in points in the games.  Given the previous
evidence of efficiency of point spread betting markets in the NBA, the relatively
small difference between point spreads and the difference in points scored should
be expected.
The next two rows on Table 1 show several interesting features of the
NBA point spread betting market.  The home team is favored in the majority of
games, reflecting the well-documented «home advantage» in sport.  Note the lack
of evidence of an equal volume of bets on either side in NBA games.  NBA bettors
wager heavily on favored teams. From the fourth row of Table 1, on average over
these five seasons, between 58.3% and 60.3% of the bets were placed on the favored
teams in NBA games.  Bettors in this market appear to like to bet on the favored
team.  Recall that Levitt interpreted similar betting imbalances in point spread
betting on NFL games as evidence of uninformed bettors.12
____________________
11 R.J. PAUL, A.P.WEINBACH, M. WILSON, Efficient markets, fair bets, and profitability in NBA
totals 1995–96 to 2001–02, in The Quart. Rev. of Ec. and Fin., vol. 44, 2004, 624-632.
12 S. LEVITT, Why Are Gambling Markets Organised so Differently from Financial Markets, cit.,
2.
TABLE 1. SAMPLE MEANS
Variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Point Spread 3,56 3,48 3,36 3,44 3,38
Difference
in Points
3,58 3,16 3,37 2,98 3,48
Home Team
Favored
0,72 0,71 0,72 0,72 0,68
%B e to n
Favorite




0,49 0,49 0,47 0,47 0,51
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The averages on Table 1 do not convey the extent of the imbalance in
betting on NBA games because the distribution of the variable is skewed to the
right.  Figure 1 shows the  distribution of the fraction of bets on the favored team
in the sample.  The red line on Figure 1 is at the «balanced book» level of 50% of
the bets on the favored team and 50% of the bets on the underdog.  The overall
sample mean is 58% and the median is 59%.  Clearly, book makers in this market
take positions on games, and allow bettors to wager heavily on favored teams.
The fifth row on Table 1 reveals the final interesting feature of this betting
market: in every season except 2007/2008, bets on the favored teams lost more
often than they won.  Levitt reports that bets placed on favorites in NFL games
also won less than 50% of the time, and cites this as evidence that book makers
alter the point spread systematically to reduce the probability that a bet placed on
the favored team wins.13 The presence of uninformed bettors in the market makes
it profitable for book makers to shade the point spread in a way to exploit the
preferences of uninformed bettors by making it less likely that their preferred bet,
a bet on the favored team to win, will pay off.  The next section further investigates
____________________
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the probability that bets on favored NBA teams win.
3. Evidence of Shading in NBA Point Spread Betting
Recall that shading takes place when a sports book systematically changes the
point spread on games to make it less likely that wagers placed by a majority of
bettors will pay off.  From Table 1, NBA bettors clearly prefer to bet on the stronger,
favored team.  Given this preference, shading takes place if the probability that a
wager on the favored team is less likely to pay off, holding the point spread constant.
One way to look for evidence of shading in NBA point spread betting is to investigate
the factors that explain successful bets on favored teams using a regression model.
Let BFWi be a dichotomous variable equal to one if a bet on the favored
team in NBA regular season game i pays off and equal to zero if a bet on the
favored team in game i loses.  BFWi is a proxy for the variable π 1 in the model of
sports book behavior above.  To investigate the possibility that book makers shade
point spreads to take advantage of uninformed bettors who prefer to bet on favored
NBA teams, I estimate the unknown parameters of the model
i i i i i e HF a PCTF a PS a a BFW + + + + = 3 2 1 0 HF a PCTF a PS a a BFW + + + + = 3 2 1 0 (4)
using the familiar probit maximum likelihood estimator.  In equation (4), PSi is the
point spread on game i, PCTFi is the percent of the bets placed on game i that are
on the favored team, HFi is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 when the home
team in game i is favored, and ei is an unobservable random variable that captures
all other factors that affect the probability that a bet on the favorite pays off in
game i.  a0, a1, a2, and a3 are unknown parameters to be estimated. BFWi depends
on a number of factors, including the point spread, the relative strengths of the
teams involved, and random factors that take place during the course of play.  The
regression model reflects these factors.
Clearly, the point spread on the game must be held constant when examining
the relationship between the fraction of bets placed on the favored team and the
probability that a bet on the favored team pays off.  However, including the point
spread, PSi, as an explanatory variable in this model raises the possibility that PSi
is correlated with the error term in equation (4), ei. The model of sports book
behavior developed above explicitly assumes that book makers set point spreads to
maximize expected returns, and the error term captures factors like unobservable
book maker decisions, so PSi may be endogenous in equation (4).  To account for
this, I use an instrumental variables estimator to account for potential endogeneity.
The first stage Ordinary Least Squares regression uses PSi as the dependent variable
and a vector of 58 indicator variables identifying the specific home and visiting
teams playing in each game as explanatory variables.  These instruments should be
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the relative strengths, reputations, and other characteristics of the teams participating
in each game.  The fitted values from this first stage regression are used in equation
(4) in place of the actual point spread variable, PSi.
The parameter of interest in equation (4) is a2, which captures the
relationship between the fraction of bets on the favorite and the probability that a
bet on the favorite pays off. If the estimate of this parameter is negative, then bets
on favorites will be less likely to pay off in games with a larger imbalance in
betting toward favorites.  This would happen when book makers shading point
spreads to take advantage of uninformed bettors who prefer to wager on the stronger
team.  The fraction of bets on the favored team, should be predetermined at the
point when the game, and the outcome of a bet on the favorite, is determined.  The
home favorite indicator variable, HFi, is included to control for home court
advantage.
Table 2 contains the marginal effects estimates for the regression model
described by equation (4).  Again, these parameter estimates were generated by an
instrumental variables probit estimator that uses a vector of team indicator variables
as instruments for the endogenous point spread variable.  I also included indicator
variables for individual seasons in the model to capture any systematic differences
in betting across seasons.  The results on Table 2 are robust to the exclusion of
these variables.  The marginal effect of changes on the point spread is positive and
significant, suggesting that as the favored team becomes stronger than the opponent,
bets on that favored team are more likely to win, other things equal.
TABLE 2. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES PROBITESTIMATES
Dependent Variable: Bet on Favored Team Wins
Variable Parameter Estimate P-Value
Point Spread 0,026 0,035
Fractions of Bets on Favorite -0,004 0,002
Home Team Favored -0,159 0,003
2004 Season -0,017 0,731
2005 Season -0,049 0,347
2006 Season -0,081 0,116
2007 Season 0,009 0,895
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Table 2 contains clear evidence that sports books shade point spreads to
take advantage of uniformed bettors.  First, the estimated marginal effect on the
home favorite indicator is negative and significant.  Bets placed on home favorites
are less likely to pay off, holding the point spread constant.  Recall from Table 1
that home teams are favored in a majority of games, and bettors like to bet on
favorites.  This parameter estimate suggests that sports books may take advantage
of these factors in a way to make bets on favored home teams less likely to win.
Second, the estimated marginal effect of the fraction of bets placed on the favorite
is negative and significant; the more imbalanced the betting on a game toward the
favored team, the lower the probability that a bet on that favored team pays off, no
matter what the point spread on the game.  The larger the imbalance in betting on
the favored team, the larger the potential gain to the book maker if a bet on the
favorite loses.  This negative estimated effect is consistent with book maker shading
of the point spread at any point spread.
The size of the estimated marginal effect is small.  This is to be expected,
because institutional factors in point spread betting markets limit the extent to
which book makers can shade the point spread.  Recall that wagers are evaluated
at the point spread what was in place at the time that the bet was made.  If a point
spread was eight points early in the betting period, and moves to five points later in
the betting period, an individual bettor could place bets on either team at either
point spread.  This leads to the possibility of arbitrage profit opportunities arising
for bettors, who could place bets on different teams at different point spreads in a
way to make a sure profit no matter what the outcome of the game.  In the jargon
of book making, the sports book could get «middled» on games when the point
spread is changed too much.  The potential for these arbitrage profit opportunities
clearly limits the size of point spread shading by book makers.
4. Discussion and conclusions
Two competing models describing how book makers operate in markets for point
spread betting on sporting events currently exist: the standard «balanced book»
model, where informed bettors make wagers based on the point spread and their
assessment of the relative strengths of the two teams and book makers set point
spreads to balance the volume of wagers equally on either side of a game, and an
alternative model including both informed bettors and uninformed bettors who
make wagers based on factors other than the point spread.  In this alternative
model book makers exploit uninformed bettors by shading the point spread on
games and operate an unbalanced book in order to increase expected returns.  The
evidence in this paper clearly supports the second model.  Data on betting volume
from more than 6,000 regular season NBA games over five seasons clearly shows
that book makers regularly have unbalanced books on these games, and that in a
majority of NBA games more bets are placed on the favored team than on the
underdog.  A balanced book on individual games appears to be the exception, not24                                                                                                              Brad R. Humphreys
the rule in NBA point spread betting markets.  If point spreads were set to balance
betting on either side of games, the probability that a bet on the favored team pays
off should be close to 50% over a large number of games.  The probability that a
bet placed on the favored team pays off in these data is less than 50%, providing
unconditional evidence of point spread shading by book makers.  In addition,
estimates from an instrumental variables probit model indicate that the larger the
imbalance in bets on the favored team, the lower the probability that a bet on the
favored team pays off.  This conditional evidence also suggests systematic shading
of the point spread on games by book makers takes place in this market.
The empirical results here add to the growing body of evidence that point
spread betting markets are more complicated than was previously thought.  Book
makers do not appear to act as passive market makers setting prices to balance bet
volume and collecting a commission from bettors in these markets.  Instead, book
makers actively participate in point spread betting markets by taking positions on
games and appear to systematically exploit uninformed bettors.  In doing this,
book makers assume more risk than they would by operating a balanced book.
The model presented in the paper motivates this behavior, showing that
expected returns on games can be increased if biased bettors participate in these
betting markets, in the sense that the subjective probability that a wager on the
favored team pays off differs systematically from the objective probability.  While
this model is useful for motivating the empirical analysis in this paper, it falls short
of a complete model of book maker behavior for several reasons.  First, the choice
variable in the model, the fraction of bets placed on the favored team, needs to be
replaced with the point spread, because book makers clearly set point spreads in
this market.  Expanding the model to include the point spread as the choice variable
requires explicit modeling of decisions made by both informed and uninformed
bettors, as well as strategic interaction between informed bettors and book makers.
The model of odds betting on parimutual horse racing developed by Hurley and
McDonough suggests one possible approach for expanding the model.14
The results also suggest several important avenues for future research in
this area.  First, the ability of sports books to increase profits by shading point
spreads depends critically on the relative number of informed and uninformed bettors
in the market.  No evidence currently exists about how many informed and
uninformed bettors participate in point spread betting markets.  Second, the empirical
analysis presented here does not take into account the total volume of betting on
each game; only the fraction of bets placed on each team is known in this data set.
If uninformed bettors systematically bet on certain games, for example games
involving teams with large fan followings or “superstar” players, then book makers
could increase profits even more by shading the point spread on games with a high
volume of uninformed bettors.  At this point, little is known about how the total
volume of bets varies across NBA games. Future research should look for additional
____________________
14 W. HURLEY, L. MCDONOUGH, A Note on the Hayek Hypothesis and Favorite-Longshot Bias in
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evidence of point spread shading that varies systematically with the total volume
of wagering on the game.26                                                                                                              Brad R. Humphreys
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